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Abstract 
 
 
The most important contribution of this research lies in considering the impact of wine, beer 
and liquors on the ratio of traffic fatalities because each kind of alcoholic beverage is 
characterized by different ethanol content. The data, drawn for case of Spain, validate our 
theoretical hypothesis. Our findings support the strategy of incrementing alcohol taxes in order 
to reduce the negative externalities of alcohol abuse. However, it is necessary to implement 
non-economic policies because of the existence of collateral effects (positive crossed price 
elasticities). 
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ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AS DETERMINANTS OF TRAFFIC 
FATALITIES 
 
José Mª Arranz and Ana I. Gil 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Traffic accidents represent one of the main causes of death in Spain (Arranz and Gil 
2008), and in most developed countries in general. The most dramatic realization behind the 
number of fatalities is that most of them could have been avoided; in fact, the most detected 
driving infractions are drunk-driving and excessive speed. Both are the most frequent reasons 
for traffic accidents (Spanish General Directorate of Traffic 2004). The most important 
contribution of this research lies in presenting evidence of the impact of different kinds of 
alcoholic beverages on the ratio of traffic fatalities in Spain1 because each kind of alcoholic 
beverage is characterized by different ethanol content. In particular, the effectiveness of 
diverse economic policies and traffic policies applied with the end of reducing the number of 
traffic fatalities2. 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical framework 
 
There is strong empirical evidence pointing to the positive link between alcohol 
consumption and the number of traffic accidents. Most governments frequently implement 
increasing alcohol taxes, which raises the final price of alcoholic beverages, and 
                                                 
1 The Spanish General Directorate of Traffic (2005) estimates that there are around 3,000 mortal 
traffic accidents per year which cause the death of 5,000 people. 
 
2 Arranz and Gil (2008) analyse the existing relationship among alcohol consumption and traffic 
accidents in Spain without distinguishing by type of alcoholic beverages. 
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consequently, reduces alcohol demand as the acquisition capacity is restrained (Young and 
Bielinska-Kwapisz 2006). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of policies centred on tax increases 
is under debate being an efficient policy for some authors (Benson et al. 2000), while for 
others, tax effects are limited due to the existence of fixed spatial effects (Mast et al. 1999) or 
due to the occurrence of measurement errors at the time of calculating alcohol prices (Young 
and Bielinska-Kwapisz 2003), or even due to the presence of alcohol consumption in early 
stages of life (Sloan et al. 1994). To reduce drunk driving, there have been implemented also 
non-monetary policies such as restraining the access of stores to alcohol licenses (McCarthy 
2003) and raising the minimum legal age at which people can buy alcoholic beverages (Cook 
and Tauchen 1984). The proportion of young males and the levels of alcohol consumption per 
capita are key factors of fatal crashes (Scuffham 2003). The effectiveness of this minimum 
legal age is questioned by Asch and Levy (1987), who concede greater importance to the 
experiences of driving and drinking than to the minimum legal age for buying alcoholic 
beverages. Nevertheless, young males are usually the ones who are more likely to be novel 
drivers and to underestimate the consequences of alcohol abuse. 
 
For the empirical application of the Spanish case (1998-2002), there had not been 
substantial legislative changes until July 2006 when the driver’s license started to be regulated 
under a point system. Concerning alcohol issues, the minimum legal age to buy alcoholic 
beverages has been increased from 16 to 18 years in most of the Autonomous Communities 
(at different times). Concerning traffic measures, one of the main legal changes (in Spain) has 
been to reduce the allowed BAC from 0.8 grams per litre in 1992 to 0.5 in 2003. So the 
effectiveness of this policy will be only analyzed when we have available data for traffic 
accidents for the year 2003 and later. Regards sanctions the monetary penalty has scarcely 
raised to 2 Euros from the 1990 to 2001 (we will consider this variable as a constant). 
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Table 1 contains the means and standard deviations of the variables classified by 
different sources from 1998 to 2002. Our empirical model is structured by two equations. First 
the individual demand for wine, beer and liquor as functions of price of alcoholic beverages, 
individual incomes and dummy variables that summarize fixed temporal and regional effects. 
Second equation estimates the rate of traffic fatalities as a function of alcohol consumption, 
traffic sanctions (proxy variable of traffic measures) and the expedited new driver’s license. 
Several dummy variables introduce fixed effects related to the different Autonomous 
Communities and time periods in both stages. These equations are: 
 
ititijt wZC += φ  i=1,2,…18; t=1998,…2002; j=1(wine), 2(beer), 3(liquor) (1) 
ititijtit vXCR ++= βα   i=1,2,…18; t=1998,…2002; j=1(wine), 2(beer), 3(liquor) (2) 
 
where Cijt represents the consumption per capita of the alcoholic beverages j for the 
Autonomous Community i for the year t; Rit is the rate of traffic fatalities; Xit and Zit are 
matrices of explicative variables; β,α and φ are vectors of parameters; wit, and vit are 
residuals which summarize the unobserved aspects that influence both alcohol consumption 
and traffic fatalities. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Concerning the estimation method, OLS can be also implemented if only if alcohol 
consumption is an exogenous variable in equation of traffic accidents (the test of Hausman 
and the Augmented Test Regression fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity). Lastly, 
due to the small number of observations (90 observations) we also test if the estimated 
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parameters might be biased by a problem of heteroskedasticity. Once we checked and 
rejected the possibility of heteroskedasticity to use OLS. 
 
3. Results 
 
For each alcoholic beverages, the direct price elasticities are negative except for wine. 
According to the cross-price elasticities of demand, an increasing in the price of wine reduces 
the regional demand per capita for beer and liquors, and in the same way, an increasing in the 
price of liquor reduces the regional demand per capita for beer. There is also empirical 
evidence that an increasing in the price of beer enhances the regional demand per capita for 
wine and liquors, and lastly, an increasing in the price of liquor enhances the regional demand 
per capita for wine. In regard to the income effect, our results bring to light that an increase of 
1% in the regional labour costs increases the regional demand for wine by 0.71%. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Our empirical results validate our theoretical hypothesis, thus higher levels of alcohol 
consumption increase the tendency of traffic fatalities, and what is more, this effect will be 
higher with the ethanol content of the alcoholic beverage. So increases of wine, beer and 
liquor demand by 1% provoke increases of 0.063%, 0.089% and 0.281% in the number of 
traffic fatalities, respectively. This result, next to the fact that an increase in the current price of 
alcoholic beverages reduces the present demand of alcohol, allows us to affirm that an 
increase in the price of alcoholic beverages reduces the rate of traffic fatalities. By definition, 
the elasticity fatalities with respect to the price of alcohol, Efp, is equal to the product of the 
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price-consumption elasticity, Ecp, and the consumption-fatality elasticity, Efc. Increases of 
beer and liquor prices in 1% reduce the number of traffic fatalities by 0.043% and 0.0026% 
respectively, although the magnitude of these last two results is not statistically significance. 
Regarding the implementation of traffic sanctions, we prove that this measure is effective in 
the way that it is negatively correlated with the rate of traffic fatalities, so for example a 10% 
increase of sanctions33 of citizens reduces the rate of traffic fatalities by a 0.34%.  Contrary to 
what we would have expected, the number of new drivers does not increase the tendency to 
suffer a traffic accident, which our analysis shows to be derived from two facts. Novice drivers 
have lower speed limits during the first year, and lower legal BAC for the first two years. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We find empirical evidence that the content of ethanol that characterises the different 
kinds of alcoholic beverages is positively correlated with the rate of traffic fatalities. It is exactly 
the differences in the hardness of the negative externalities which justifies the different rate of 
taxation for each kind of alcoholic beverages. Although taxes are the most applied public 
policy instrument for reducing alcohol abuse, we have to be cautious analyzing the efficiency 
of these policies, because in reducing the consumption of a specific alcoholic beverage, we 
could be promoting the consumption of others, with an even higher ethanol content. We also 
find that the implementation of traffic sanctions is effective in a way that is negatively 
                                                 
3 This result brings to light the effectiveness of implementing harder traffic sanctions to reduce traffic 
fatalities in Spain as in the USA according to the empirical study of Young and Likens (2000). Kenkel 
and Koch (2001) suggest that it is necessary to increase the penalties until they reach their real social 
costs. 
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correlated with the rate of traffic fatalities. In fact, the policy makers have a wide range of 
possibilities, such as a driver’s license that operates under a point system. Although in Spain 
this system has been recently implemented, the experiences of other countries show positive 
results (for example France). 
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Table 1. Variables and descriptive statistics (1998-2002).  
Variables Description Mean (S. Deviation)
Survey of Deaths by Cause, Spanish National Institute of Statistics 
Yit=RFT Rate of traffic fatalities (logistic transformation) by Autonomous Communities. 
0.016 
(0.03) 
Statistic Yearbook about Labour Issues, Spanish Labour Ministry 
INCOMEDF Labour cost per worker by Autonomous Communities. (in Euros deflated to 2001) 
1313.932 
 (157.777) 
Consumption Household Survey, Spanish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishing 
CWINE Annual consumption of wine per capita (Kg.) by Autonomous Communities. 12.301 (4.898) 
CBEER Annual consumption of beer per capita (Kg.) by Autonomous Communities. 8.848 (5.969) 
CLIQUOR Annual consumption of liquors per capita (Kg.) by Autonomous Communities. 2.971 (2.978) 
PWINE Price of wine by Autonomous Communities (Euros/Kg.) 2.839 (0.331) 
PBEER Price of beer by Autonomous Communities (Euros/Kg.) 1.154 (0.097) 
PLIQUOR Price of liquors by Autonomous Communities (Euros/Kg.) 7.729 (0.652) 
Statistic Yearbook, General Directorate of Traffic 
SANCTION(t-1) Number of sanctions (every 1000 citizens) by Autonomous Communities for the period t-1. 
133.650 
(179.099) 
NDA Number of novice drivers type A and A1 (every 1000 citizens) by Autonomous Communities for the period t. 
0.927 
(1.656) 
We have also included dummies for year and region variables 
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Table 2. Estimation of the demand for alcoholic beverages. 
 Wine Consumption Beer Consumption Liquor Consumption 
 Coef. S. Dev. Elasticity Coef. S. Dev. Elasticity Coef. S. Dev. Elasticity
PWINE 0.0024* 0.0014 0.4590 0.0005 0.0012 0.1230 0.0005*** 0.0002 0.4205 
PBEER -0.0087** 0.0039 -0.6882 -0.0044 0.0034 -0.4884 -0.0013** 0.0005 -0.4358 
PLIQUOR -0.0002 0.0007 -0.1001 0.0003 0.0006 0.1959 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0942 
INCOMEDF 0.0007* 0.0004 0.7069 0.0001 0.0003 0.2139 0.0001 0.0000 0.0355 
INTERCEPT 0.3799 0.6324 - 1.3538** 0.5598 - 0.1506* 0.0846  
F-Snedecor 
(Prob) 9.42 (0.00) 22.74 (0.00) 302.10 (0.00) 
R2 (Adjusted) 0.5658 0.7709 0.9790 
R2 0.6330 0.8063 0.9822 
Note: *** indicates individual significance at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level ; 
 Alcohol Consumption has been divided by 10;  
 The elasticity terms have been evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.  
 
 
Table 3. Estimation of the rate of traffic fatalities. 
Model 2  
Coefficient S. Deviation Elasticity 
WINECONSUMPTION 0.0009 0.0010 0.0630 
BEERCONSUMPTION 0.0019* 0.0012 0.0886 
LIQUORCONSUMPTION 0.0135* 0.0078 0.2808 
SANCTION(t-1) -0.0004* 0.0002 -0.0344 
NDA -0.0004* 0.0002 -0.0218 
INTERCEPT 0.0079*** 0.0026 - 
Note:   *** indicates individual significance at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level ; 
 The SANCTION (t-1) variable has been divided by 100; 
 The elasticity terms have been evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.  
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